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Abstract
Individual evaluation interviews have become a widespread practice.
52% of employees in French manufacturing firms over 50 employees de-
clared an annual individual evaluation interview in 1997. However whereas
the problem of constructing an optimal contract with subjective evalua-
tion (which is defined simply as a signal in most papers) receives a large
attention, firm-level evaluation interviews are strikingly left aside from
economic analysis. This paper aims at identifying the underlying logics
of individual evaluation interviews in the case of individual production
and of team production. Especially, it aims at analyzing the relationships
between effort, wage distribution within the firms and individual evalua-
tion interviews. From a theoretical standpoint, three papers by Alchian
and Demsetz (1972), by Che and Yoo (2001) and by MacLeod (2003) are
closely related to our paper and from an empirical point of view, a re-
cent paper by Engellandt and Riphahn (2004). We test in our paper four
predictions. First, evaluation interviews have a positive impact on effort.
Second, evaluation interviews increase the effort through two effects: the
classical incentive effect and also a high selection effect. Third, evaluation
interviews are associated with positive beliefs regarding wage and work
recognition. Finally, evaluation interviews are associated with monetary
gains for employees. These predictions are tested using a matched em-
ployer /employee survey on Computerization and Organizational Change
(survey "Changements Organisationnels et Informatisation", C.O.I.), con-
ducted in 1997 over a sample of about 4000 firms and 9000 employees.
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"If the economic organization meters poorly, with rewards and production only
loosely correlated, then productivity will be smaller; but if the economic
organization meters well productivity will be greater."
Alchian and Demsetz (1972, page 779)
1 Introduction
In the classical Principal-Agent model, if the Agent’s level of effort is not observ-
able by the Principal then the optimal contract must depend on any verifiable
measure of the Agent’s performance. Most papers take as verifiable measure,
the output of the task performed by the Agent. And these papers construct the
optimal wage in such a way that it is an increasing function of output. How-
ever according to MacLeod and Parent (1999) and Prendergast (1999), in real
world, very few firms use such a mechanism but instead a mechanism in which
the employees’ bonus depend on a subjective evaluation of their performance
by the Principal. Such mechanisms (in which the Agent’s wage does not de-
pend to a verifiable measure of performance but instead to a subjective one) are
called Principal-Agent models with subjective evaluation : see MacLeod (2003)
for a static analysis and Levin (2003) for a repeated game analysis. However
in these analysis, the subjective performance measure is simply modeled as a
private or public signal. It seems that evaluation, in general, are made through
the so-called evaluation interviews which are now widespread in most OECD
countries. In France for instance, 52% of employees in manufacturing firms over
50 employees declared in 1997 (according to the COI survey1) that they had
an annual individual evaluation interview. Moreover, analyzing (using a panel
data set describing 6500 employees of a large international company) the effect
of annual individual evaluation over employee level of effort (measured by work-
ers’ days of absence and by overtime work), Engellandt and Riphahn (2004) find
out that surprise bonus payments and flexibility in the evaluation of individual
performances over time provide effective incentives for employee effort. There
is therefore a need for a specific theoretical analysis of evaluation interviews.
It is the purpose of this paper to provide theoretical insights into the role of
evaluation interview. More precisely, we want to analyze the consequences of
individual evaluation interviews on wage profiles (and of course on effort). In
doing so, we are going to distinguish two different ways of organizing work: in
teams or individually. When work is organized in teams, then the implemen-
tation of a task is shared between employees generating a need for cooperation
and coordination. When work is "individualized" then each task is performed
by an employee independently.
Concerning individual production, we propose a theoretical framework based
on a Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation of effort through an in-
dividual interview. Our model can be considered as a sub-model of the model
of MacLeod (2003) but not completely for four reasons. First in our analysis,
1The COI survey is a matched employer/employee survey on Computerization and Orga-
nizational Change (survey "Changements Organisationnels et Informatisation"), conducted
in 1997 by the French ministries of Labor (DARES), Industry (SESSI), Trade and Services
(SCEES) and the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE).
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the individual evaluation interview is based upon some precise common knowl-
edge criteria (which are accepted by both parties -Principal and Agent). Second
we assume that the Principal’s subjective evaluation of the Agent’s effort takes
into account the Agent’s self-reports on a set of criteria. Third the production
technology matters. Finally, we do not address the question of the strategy-
proofness or the Nash-implementability of the individual interview mechanism.
Let us now briefly explain our formal analysis. Let Θ = {0, 1, 2} be the set
of efforts’ level where the maximal level of effort that the Agent can legally
provide is k = 2. Let us call w∗2 the associated incentive wage. If the Princi-
pal implements the optimal wage w∗2 then the Agent will play an effort k = 2.
Hence in the classical mechanism, there is no need for the Principal to evaluate
ex-post the Agent’s level of effort. So what is the role of individual evaluation
interviews in the individual production ? In order to understand our explana-
tion, let us stress out two characteristics of the classical incentive mechanism
(without individual evaluation interviews). Suppose that the production can
either be a success (with a probability which depends on the Agent’s level of
effort) or a failure. Therefore a first characteristic of the classical incentive
scheme is that the Agent’s wage will not directly depend on the level of effort,
but instead on the success or the failure of the production. Of course, even if
the Agent provides the maximal level of effort, the success of the production
is not guaranteed. The second characteristic of classical incentive schemes is
that if the Principal can choose between a sub-modular and a super-modular
technology, he will always choose a super-modular one. The first reason is that
when the production technology is super-modular, the probability that it is a
success, is an increasing convex function of the effort (while this probability is
an increasing concave function in the case of sub-modularity). The second one
is that the agent’s wage in the case of a super-modular production technology
is lower than his wage in the case of a sub-modular production technology.
These two characteristics, from our point of view, may explain why it is dif-
ficult to implement a classical incentive scheme in real world. On the contrary,
in an incentive scheme with individual evaluation interview, the Agent will get
his wage (even if the production is a failure) if he has been evaluated by the
Principal as having provided an effort of level k = 2. Moreover the Agent’s
wage in an incentive scheme with individual evaluation interview and super-
modular production technology is higher than his wage in classical incentive
scheme with super-modular technology. However the probability of getting this
wage is smaller. Therefore the incentives schemes with evaluation interview will
attract people having a low disutility of effort. Namely the incentive mechanism
with evaluation interview always includes in addition to the normal incentive
effect, a selection effect whose consequence is to attract the agents whose disu-
tility of effort is the weaker. And this selection effect will increase the expected
profit of the Principal since the probability of success of task is an increasing
function of the agent’s level of effort.
Concerning team production, even if the Principal faces the same problems
as in individual production, the main issue in (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972
or Holmstrom, 1982) is free riding.
Therefore in team production, the role of evaluation interviews is not re-
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stricted to the ex-post evaluation (through an individual interview) of the Agents’
level of effort. Indeed an ex-post evaluation of agents’ level of effort will not
prevent them from shirking (except if individual interview as a mechanism can
detect with probability equal to 1 any agent who shirks).
Thus we develop the following argument. The Principal prefers to implement a
supermodular technology production. However in this case there exist several
Nash equilibria, among which the solution (0, 0). Therefore in order to avoid
the implementation of the equilibrium (0, 0), it must be the case that firms
enforce coordination among the agents. The issue is not new and is well doc-
umented in the literature: coordination can be obtained using non-monetary
incentives or monetary incentives. A famous example of non-monetary incen-
tives is the so-called "peer pressure" by Kandel and Lazear (1992). We show
that ex-ante (to the production) individual evaluation interviews belong to the
class of non-monetary coordinating incentives and therefore play exactly the
same role -concerning the implementation of the equilibrium (1, 1) - as "peer
pressure". However if implementing ex-ante an evaluation interview solves the
free-riding problem in team, the wage of the agents still depends to the condi-
tional probability of success of the task. As in the individual production case,
the Principal will implement an ex-post evaluation interview which aims is to
evaluate the level of effort and therefore to condition the wage not on the success
of the task but on the evaluation of the Agents’ effort.
Of course our explanations of subjective evaluation through evaluation in-
terterview are not exclusive. Indeed other explanations exist in sociology, theo-
ries of organizations or industrial relations. For instance, evaluation interviews
are a "domination method" used by firms that intensify work by imposing both
business-bureaucratic constraints and market constraints. Evaluation interviews
may also contribute to elaborate the formalization of work organization. Lastly,
evaluation interviews might deter social unrest within organizations in which
the dispute potential is important 2.
We have derived from our theoretical analysis, four predictions that have
been tested3 using a matched employer/employee survey on Computerization
and Organizational Change and distinguishing individual and collective workers.
The predictions are the following. First, evaluation interviews have a positive
impact on effort. Second, evaluation interviews increase the effort through two
effects: the classical incentive effect and also a high selection effect. Third,
evaluation interviews are associated with positive beliefs regarding wage and
work recognition. Finally, evaluation interviews are associated with monetary
gains for employees.
The paper includes five sections. The second section is devoted to our the-
oretical analysis of evaluation interviews in the case of individual production.
In the third section, we analyse the role of evaluation interviews in the case of
team production. In the fourth section, we test our predictions over the COI
survey. Finally the fifth section concludes.
2Faced with the possibility of expressing themselves during interviews, employees would
be less incited to contest management.
3The tests have been implemented using a propensity score methodology which allows to
control for selections effects due to background characteristics.
4
2 Evaluation Interview in Individual Production
2.1 Basic setting
We want in this section to analyse the function of individual evaluation inter-
view in a productive context where work is "individualised", that is designed in
such a way that tasks are not shared between employees.
We consider (see Che and Yoo, 2001) a Principal-Agent framework in which
production requires only one task. This task is performed by the Agent who
makes an effort decision unobservable by the Principal. Production, that is the
outcome of the task, is a random variable X that can either succeed (X = 1)
or fail (X = 0) giving respectively R or 0 payoffs to the Principal. The Agent’s
individual effort denoted K (K is a random variable from the Principal’s stand
point) belongs to the set Θ = {0, 1, 2} which is the set of levels of effort legally
possible. In other words, the maximal level of effort that the Principal can
legally incite the agent to supply is K = 2. However the general set of lev-
els of effort is Θg = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4...,m}. Let Pr(X = 1|K = k) = qk and
Pr(X = 0|K = k) = 1 − qk respectively the conditional probability of success
of the task given the Agent’s level of effort k, and the conditional probability
of failure of the task given the Agent’s level of effort k. We will suppose that
the Principal is risk-neutral, with a linear utility function b(r) = r and that
the Agent is risk-averse with a utility function U(r, k) = u(r)− v(k) where u is
an increasing and concave function such that: u(0) = 0, u(r) ≥ 0 ∀r ≥ 0; and
the Agent’s disutility function of effort v(k) = e × k where the unit of effort
noted e is strictly positive. Moreover the Agent’s reservation utility is equal to
zero. Finally we assume 4 that 1 > q2 > q1 > q0 ≥ 0 and that 2q1 ≥ q2 (which
guarantees that the participation constraint is fulfilled).
The relationship between effort and production is an important feature of the
production technology. We will consider two alternatives: production is either
super-modular or sub-modular. Let us then set the following definition concern-
ing this property of the production technology.
Definition 1
Super-Modularity q2 − q1 ≥ q1 − q0
Sub-Modularity q2 − q1 ≤ q1 − q0
Broadly speaking when production is super-modular (respectively sub-modular),
the return on effort is increasing (respectively decreasing) in the level of effort.
2.2 Classical incentive contracts
It is straightforward to see (and this is well known in the literature) that for
each level of effort we have the following incentive wages:
4Over Θg = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4...,m}, we have 1 > qm¯ > ... > q3 > q2 > q1 > q0 ≥ 0.
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w∗0 = 0
Sub-modularity: w∗1 = u−1(e/(q1 − q0)) w∗2 = u−1(e/(q2 − q1))
Super-modularity: w∗1 indeterminate w∗2 = u−1(2e/(q2 − q0))
When the production technology is super-modular the Principal will implement
the mechanism (w∗2 , k = 2), which is designed in such a way that the Agent
plays the maximal level of effort.
When the production technology is sub-modular and if income R is not high(
R ≤ q2u−1(e/(q2−q1))−q1u−1(e/(q1−q0))q2−q1
)
, then the Principal will ask for the level
of effort k = 1. Otherwise, he will ask for a level of effort k = 2 .
However, if the principal can choose the production technology (sub-modular
versus super-modular), he will always prefer a super-modular technology: on
the one hand because the Agent’s wage u−1(2e/(q2 − q0)) is lower than in the
sub-modular technology case, and on the other hand because the probability of
success of the task is then a convex function of the level of effort.
2.3 Incentive mechanism with individual evaluation inter-
view
One main message can be drawn from the previous subsection. It is about
the potential conflict between the preferences of the Principal and those of the
Agent concerning the production technology. Basically, the Principal always
prefers a super-modular technology, while the Agent prefers a sub-modular one.
Hence, although the incentive wage w∗2 respects the participation constraint,
some agents may resist when the Principal implements a super-modular pro-
duction technology. This resistance will be stronger when the firm moves from
a sub-modular technology to a super-modular one with the same employees
(indeed their wages will decrease5). A mechanism with evaluation interview
could mitigate this potential resistance, because the Agent then gets a higher
wage than w∗2 , the classical incentive wage with a super-modular production
technology.
Let us first define what an individual evaluation interview is. The theoretical
determination of the optimal evaluation interview is a problem of its own that we
are not going to solve in this paper. This would imply a rigorous assessment of
the optimal6 set of criteria evaluation. But we are going to leave this problem
aside by simply assuming that the Principal determines (seeking advice from
the Agent) a finite set S of criteria (characteristics) that he considers important
for estimating the Agent’s effort. Let us call vs ∈ Ξs the true level of agent’s
criterion s (s = 1 to S). We will assume that it is a private information namely
that vs is a random variable which realization is only observed by the Agent
5The decreasing of wage after an organizational change is not only theoretical. For instance
in their empirical seminal paper, Hamilton et al. (2003) show after that a move from an
individual production to a team one, high productivity workers take earnings losses when
joining a team.
6In the sense that it minimizes the evaluation error.
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(ie. The Principal does not observe it). According to the revelation principle
we can restrict ourselves to the following direct mechanism Σs = (Ξs; g) where
g is a result function,
g : Ξs → Ξs
vs 7→ g(vs)
Definition 2 We call individual evaluation interview, the mechanism Σ =
(Σ1, ...,Σs, ...ΣS ; a) where the Σs (s = 1, ...S) are direct mechanisms and a is an
aggregation function of marks resulting from the assessment of each criterion.
a :
S∏
s=1
Ξs →M
(g(v1), ..., g(vS)) 7→ a(g(v1), ..., g(vS))
Where M is a marks set.
This definition calls to two remarks. First in order to construct his own
evaluation of the Agent’s performance, the Principal may use the Agent’s self-
evaluations. Second, we assume the bounded rationality of the Principal, gen-
erating potential errors in his evaluation of the Agent’s level of effort (see also
Assumption 1). Concerning this latter point, an interesting question from our
point of view is to know whether it is theoretically possible to construct an
incentive mechanism with individual evaluation interview when the Principal
makes mistakes in his evaluation of the Agent’s level of effort. Nonetheless in
order to simplify we will assume that the probability of evaluation error is fixed
and is common knowledge. To complete our comment of definition 2 let us re-
mark that since the purpose of the evaluation interview is to get a subjective
evaluation of effort, then the Principal can directly take M = Θ.
Let I be the evaluation mark obtained by the Agent after the production pro-
cess: I ∈ {0, 1, 2} = Θ. If I = 0 or 1 then the agent does not receives a premium.
If I = 2 then the agent receives a premium p. Let us call p the premium variable.
We thus have:
p =
{
p if I = 2
0 otherwise
Of course, this mechanism must respect the participation and the incentive
constraints. Moreover it must also be such as:
• the principal expected benefit is at least equal to his expected benefit in
the classical mechanism,
• the agent’s expected utility is at least equal to his expected utility in the
classical mechanism (because classical mechanism is the benchmark).
We have formally for the Agent:
E[u(p)|k = 2]− 2e ≥ 0 (2.1)
E[u(p)|k = 2]− 2e ≥ E[u(p)|k = 1]− e (2.2)
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E[u(p)|k = 2]− 2e ≥ E[u(p)|k = 0] (2.3)
E[u(p)|k = 2]− 2e ≥ E[u(w∗2)|k = 2]− 2e (2.4)
And for the Principal:
q2[R− Pr(I = 2)p] + (1− q2)[0− Pr(I = 2)p]− αp ≥ q2(R− w∗2) (2.5)
where αp is the cost of the interview7, α ∈ [0, 1]. Let us assume without loss
of generality that α = 0.
Let us set γik = Pr(I = i|K = k), the probability that the Agent’s level of
effort were evaluated as being i when his true level of effort is k. And assume
that:
Assumption 1: γik > 0 ∀i, k.
This assumption simply states that an individual evaluation interview is not
strategy-proof and Nash-implementable mechanism.
Let us also set the following assumption:
Assumption 2: γ2
k′ = γ
′
, ∀k′ ∈ {0, 1}.
This assumption implies that the probability of evaluating the Agent’s effort
equal to 2 when it is lower than 2 is independent from the true level of effort.
Further, we define an evaluation system in the following way:
Definition 3 We call evaluation system, denoted E, the profile
E =
(
Θ = {0, 1, 2}, {γik}k,i
)
Definition 4 An evaluation system E is efficient in detecting a level of effort
k ∈ Θ if γkk > γkk′ , ∀k
′
< k, k
′ ∈ Θ .
Definition 5 An evaluation system E is efficient if it is efficient for every
level of effort. It is said inefficient otherwise.
Let us go back to inequalities (2.1) to (2.5). They lead to the following
program Pmax:
Max q2R− (γ22 + γ21 + γ20)p
p, {γ2k}
under the constraints:
(1) γ22u(p)− 2e ≥ 0
(2) (γ22 − γ21)u(p)− e ≥ 0
(3) (γ22 − γ20)u(p)− 2e ≥ 0
(4) γ22u(p) ≥ q2u(w∗2)
(5) (γ22 + γ
2
1 + γ
2
0)p ≤ q2w∗2
7That is to say the cost of an evaluation interview is measured by the time devoted to this
interview. The Principal runs the interview and does not pays himself.
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We are going to discuss some claims deriving from program Pmax and high-
lighting different conditions under which the Principal implements individual
evaluation interview when agents fulfil their task on their own.
Claim 1 The efficiency of the Evaluation System for the level of effort 2 is
a necessary condition to the existence of a solution for the program (Pmax).
Indeed the Evaluation System is not efficient for the level of effort 2 if γ22 ≤ γ21
or γ22 ≤ γ20 . If γ22 ≤ γ21 , then there is no p which respects constraint (2). And if
γ22 ≤ γ20 then there is no p which respects constraint (3).
As a consequence of claim 1, we are going to restrict ourselves to the class of
Evaluation Systems which are efficient for the level of effort 2. We want now to
set a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementation of a mechanism
with evaluation interview.
Claim 2 If the production technology is sub-modular, then the following two
conditions are equivalent :
1. It is possible to construct an incentive mechanism with evaluation inter-
view.
2. q2q1 ≥
2γ22
γ22+γ
2
0
Condition (2) : q2q1 ≥
2γ22
γ22+γ
2
0
is difficult to fulfill. Indeed let us recall that
with a sub-modular technology, we have:
q1 − q0 > q2 − q1
Therefore we think that incentives mechanisms with evaluation interview will
be rarely implemented when the production technology is sub-modular. In this
case, the marginal return from increasing the effort from level 1 to level 2 is too
low to compensate for the bounded rationality of the Principal.
Concerning super-modular technology it is easy to see that:
Claim 3 Let us assume a super-modular technology then the two following
conditions are equivalent.
1. It is possible to construct an incentive mechanism with evaluation inter-
view.
2. γ
2
2
γ20
≤ q2q0
Condition (2) from claim 3 is not costly. For example it is trivially satisfied
when q0 = 0. How can it be interpreted ? Let us remark that q2q0 is the ratio
of the probability of success of the task when the level of effort is k = 2 to the
probability of success of the task when the level of effort is k = 0, whereas γ
2
2
γ20
is the ratio of probability of evaluating rightly the Agent’s level of effort to be
k = 2, to the probability of evaluating the Agent’s level of effort to be k = 2
while he has provided an effort k = 0. In order to understand condition (2) from
claim 3, we have to remind that the Principal receives income R only when the
task succeeds. Within the mechanism with evaluation interview, the Agent only
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receives the premium p if he has been evaluated as having provided a level of
effort equal to 2. Hence (contrary to the classical mechanism), the Agent’s
premium is independent from the result of the task he performs. Condition
(2) tells that the relative increase in the probability of receiving the premium
p when the Agent switches from the level of effort 0 to the level of effort 2,
has to be smaller than the relative increase in the probability of success of the
task (which is for the principal the probability of receiving income R), when the
Agent switches from the level of effort 0 to the level of effort 2. Thus condition
(2) can be viewed as a stochastic budget constraint. So we can deduce from
claim 3 that the incentive mechanisms with evaluation interviews have a high
likelihood to be implemented when the production technology is super-modular.
Claim 4 If the production technology is super-modular. Then the optimal
contract in the incentive mechanism with evaluation interview is:
p = u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ20
)
γ22 , γ
′
such as
u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ′
)
≤ q2
γ22+2γ
′ u−1
(
2e
q2−q0
)
Suppose now a super-modular production technology. Then two messages
can be drawn from claim 4. According to the first message, the Agent’s wage,
p = u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ20
)
, within the incentive mechanism with evaluation interview is
greater than his wage in the classical incentive mechanism, w∗2 = u−1
(
2e
q2−q0
)
.
Nonetheless the probability of receiving this wage is weaker: γ22 + γ21 + γ20 ≤ q2.
In order to understand the second message, let us recall that in the classical
optimal contract (with no evaluation interview) the Agent’s wage is higher when
the technology is sub-modular than when it is super-modular. If the firm moves
from a sub-modular technology to a super-modular one with the same employ-
ees, the Principal may use evaluation interviews to mitigate potential resistance
from the Agents: he will pay the same wage as in the case of a sub-modular
technology with no evaluation interviews but he will reduce the probability for
the Agent of getting this wage.
Namely if the Principal wants to pay the Agent for the wage corresponding
to the effort k = 2 in the case of a sub-modular technology within the classi-
cal mechanism, then he will construct the incentive mechanism with evaluation
interview in such a way that:
0 < γ
′ ≤ 1
3
(
q2u
−1( 2e
q2−q0
)
u−1
(
e
q2−q1
)sub − 2(q2 − q1)sub
)
γ22 = 2(q2 − q1)sub + γ
′
Where (q2 − q1)sub = q2 − q1 in the sub-modular technology case.
Indeed the wage corresponding to a sub-modular technology is u−1
(
e
(q2−q1)sub
)
.
Thus the principal will set p = u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ20
)
= u−1
(
e
(q2−q1)sub
)
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That is to say γ22 − γ20 = 2(q2 − q1)sub. But according to claim 4 it must be
the case that: p ≤ q2
γ22+γ
2
1+γ
2
0
w∗2
Namely:
u−1
( e
q2 − q1
)
≤ q2
γ22 + γ
2
1 + γ
2
0
u−1
( 2e
q2 − q0
)
⇒ u−1
( e
q2 − q1
)
≤ q2
γ22 + 2γ
′ u
−1
( 2e
q2 − q0
)
Since
γ22 = 2(q2 − q1)sub + γ20
then
u−1
( e
q2 − q1
)
≤ q2
2(q2 − q1)sub + 3γ′ u
−1
( 2e
q2 − q0
)
and
γ
′ ≤ 1
3
(
q2u
−1
(
2e
q2−q0
)
u−1
(
e
q2−q1
)sub − 2(q2 − q1)sub
)
.
2.4 Selection effect and over-intensification of work
According to the previous subsection, the Agent gets his wage p only if he has
been evaluated by the Principal, playing an effort equal to 2 ; on the other hand
this wage p is greater that the one in the classical incentive scheme (however
the probability of getting p is weaker). Therefore we expect that the incentives
schemes with evaluation interview will attract people having a low disutility of
effort. The purpose of this subsection is to show it formally. Let us remind that
Θ = {0, 1, 2} is the set of levels of effort legally possible but that the general set
of levels of effort is Θg = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4...m}. Let us assume a continuum of agents
but such that over Θ = {0, 1, 2} -the legal set of effort- agents have the same
behavior with respect to their desutilities of effort. Therefore over Θ = {0, 1, 2}
the Principal cannot offer a contract which depends on the Agent’s type θ.
Furthermore the Principal cannot construct a contract (wk, k ≥ 3) because a
court of justice may find from wk the implicit level of effort (which is here illegal
since it is higher than 2) that the Principal wants the Agent to provide. The
disutility of effort is written as:
vθ(k) =
 ke if k ∈ Θ = {0, 1, 2}(2 + θk)e with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 if k ∈ {3, 4, ...m}
Such a functional means that given a level of effort k ≥ 3, the smaller the
type θ, the weaker the Agent’s disutility of effort. Why an Agent of type θ might
increase his level of effort beyond the legal maximal level, without a monetary
compensation (indeed, one can remark that the Agent’s wage p = u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ20
)
does not change even if the Agent increases his effort beyond the required level)?
The reason is that when the evaluation system satisfies the property set in
definition 6 then if the Agent increases his level of effort beyond the required
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level k = 2, the probability of being detected (and thus of receiving the premium
p = u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ20
)
) as having provide a level of effort k = 2, increases.
Definition 6 An evaluation system E = (Θ = {0, 1, 2}, {γik}k,i) includes an
informal detection system of a given illegal level of effort k
′ ≥ 3 if:
1. γ2
k′ is well defined, and
2. γ2
k′ respects the following pseudo-monotony condition: γ
2
k′ ≥ γ2k , ∀k ∈
{2, 3, 4, ...k′ − 1}.
This definition does not contradict definition 4 which holds for all k, k
′ ∈
Θ = {0, 1, 2}. In order to understand definition 6, let us consider an agent
of type θ = 0. Then if he provides an effort k = m, he has the same effort
disutility than when providing an effort k = 2 with the certitude8 of getting
the wage p = u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ20
)
. Such an agent is rational since when increasing his
level of effort beyond the maximal legal level (k = 2) he increases his expected
utility.
Claim 5 Condition (2) is a necessary condition to Condition (1).
1. An agent provides a level of effort k
′
superior strictly to the maximal legal
level.
2. The evaluation system E = (Θ = {0, 1, 2}, {γik}k,i) includes an informal
detection system of the illegal level of effort k
′
.
Indeed on the one hand (1) implies:
γ2
k′u(p)− (θk
′
+ 2)e > γ22u(p)− 2e
Which gives:
(γ2
k′ − γ22)u(p) > θk
′
e
Since θk
′
e ≥ 0 it implies necessarily that γ2
k′ − γ22 > 0.
On the other hand (1) implies that for all k ∈ {3, ...m}, k 6= k′ :
γ2
k′u(p)− (θk
′
+ 2)e > γ2ku(p)− (θk + 2)e
Which gives:
(γ2
k′ − γ2k)u(p) > θ(k
′ − k)e
If k ∈ {3, ..., k′ − 1}, then we have θ(k′ − k)e ≥ 0. This latter point implies
necessarily that γ2
k′ − γ2k > 0. And we get the desired result.
Moreover we get the following:
Claim 6 The following two conditions are equivalent.
1. An agent provides a level of effort k
′
superior strictly to the maximal legal
level.
8The Agent will have considerably increase the probability of being evaluated as having
provide an effort k = 2.
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2. Agent’s type is θ < δ(k
′
) with δ(k
′
) = 2
k
(γ2
k
′−γ2k)
(γ22−γ20) where k = k
′
1{k=2} +
(k
′ − k)1{k≥3}, ∀k ∈ {2, ..., k′ − 1, k′ + 1, ...m}.
We can remark that condition (2) of claim (6), can be rewritten in the
following way:
θk
2
<
γ2
k′ − γ2k
γ22 − γ20
An interesting interpretation can then be drawn from it according to which
there are two effects intervening in the Agent’s decision of providing a higher
effort that the maximal legal level 2. The first effect is in relation with the
quantity
γ2
k
′−γ2k
γ22−γ20 which expresses the marginal variation (with respect to the
situation where he provides the level of effort 2) of the probability that the agent
were detected as having provided the level of effort 2 when he increases his level
of effort beyond the required maximal legal level. This marginal variation is the
same for all agents whatever their types θ. However there is a second effect we
call cost effect expressed by the quantity θk2 which measures the effort’s marginal
disutility when an agent of a given type θ goes from effort 2 to a higher one.
Given his type θ, the cost effect slows down the increasing of the Agent’s level
of effort. We can also remark that for a given level of effort, the smaller the
type θ, the weaker the cost effect. Finally, claim 6 tells that an agent will decide
to provide an effort beyond the maximal legal level 2 if the marginal variation
of the probability of getting the associated premium p = u−1
(
2e
γ22−γ20
)
(which is
the same for all agents) is above the marginal cost (which depends on his type
θ and on the level of effort provided).
Moreover according to claim 6, the Agent provides a level of effort at least
equal to a given level k
′
(strictly greater than the maximal legal level) if and
only if his type is θ < δ(k
′
) with δ(k
′
) = 2
k
(γ2
k
′−γ2k)
(γ22−γ20) where k = k
′
1{k=2} + (k
′ −
k)1{k≥3}, ∀k ∈ {2, ..., k′ − 1}.
Let us illustrate this point with k
′
= 3. An agent provides an effort at least
equal to 3 if and only if his type θ is strictly weaker than 23
(γ23−γ22
γ22−γ20
)
. Thus the
shape of the probability of detection γ2k in the neighborhood of effort k = 3,
will play a crucial role. For instance if γ2k is highly strongly convex in the
neighborhood of k = 3 in such a way that γ23 − γ22 > 23
(
γ22 − γ20
)
then all agents
whatever their types will provide an effort at least equal to 3. Of course it seems
more reasonable to think that γ2k is rather concave in the neighborhood of k = 3,
that is to say that γ23 − γ22 < γ22 − γ20 . But even in this case there are still some
individuals who can provide an effort at least equal to k = 3. Let us illustrate
this point with γ20 = 0.1, γ22 = 0.7, γ23 = 0.9. Then agents with type θ <
2
9 will
provide an effort at least equal to k=3.
The important thing to keep in mind here, is that when supposing that
evaluation system E = (Θ = {0, 1, 2}, {γik}k,i) includes an informal system of
detection of the illegal level of effort k = 3 then the quantity θ < 23
(γ23−γ22
γ22−γ20
)
is always strictly positive. Namely the incentive mechanism with evaluation
interview always includes in addition to the normal incentive effect, a selection
effect whose consequence is to attract the agents whose disutility of effort is the
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weaker. Of course we do not say that the incentives mechanism with evaluation
interview only attracts individuals which will provide an effort greater than
the maximal level required by the Principal. Indeed we have assumed that the
optimal contract constructed by the Principal is done from the legal set of efforts
Θ = {0, 1, 2}. And over this set, the agents have the same behavior with respect
to disutilities of effort. Nevertheless a simple reasoning shows that the selection
effect will be higher in the case of production with evaluation interview than
in the case without evaluation interview. To conclude, production structure
with super-modular technology and evaluation interview will lead to an over-
intensification of work in the sense that the Agents will provide efforts above
the maximal effort required by the Principal. Of course since the probability
qk of success of the task is, over Θg = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4...,m}, a monotone increasing
function of the effort level k, then, assuming that the revenue R is high enough
(i.e. R ≥ p(γ2k+...+γ23qk−q2 )), the selection effect increases qkR−p(γ2k+...+γ22+γ21+γ20)
: the effective expected profit of the Principal.
3 Evaluation Interview in Team Production
3.1 Basic Setting
The development of various managing devices favoring teamwork (quality cir-
cles, autonomous work groups, problem solving groups, project teams etc.) and
thereby joint responsibility for complex tasks reveals that one of the main fea-
ture of the so-called new organizational forms is team production. For instance
in their report on the British’s Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004
(WERS 2004), Kersley et al. (2005) point out that : "Team-working was the
common, with almost three-quarters (72 per cent) of workplaces having at least
some core employees in formally-designated teams..". This empirical fact sug-
gests to analyze the role of evaluation interviews in team production in Alchian
and Demsetz (1972)’ setting. Even if the two authors do not explicitely use a
principal-agent model, their analysis can clearly be incorporated in a principal-
agent model with subjective evaluation. Indeed in such kind of model, the focus
is on the employees and their evaluation.
We will consider the same framework as in the previous section, however the
task (which is the same as in the individual production case) is now performed by
a team of two agents who make an effort decision unobservable by the principal.
Our definition of team (borrowed from Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) is very
restricted here since only a global signal X concerning production is available.
In particular the Principal cannot calculate the contribution of each agent to
the production. Finally, let us recall that in the individual production case (see
the previous section), the set of levels of effort legally possible was Θ = {0, 1, 2}.
Therefore in the team production case (in order to be consistent with the case
of individual production) it must be the case (see Che and Yoo, 2001) that
from the point of view of the Principal, the individual effort of agent i (= 1, 2)
denoted Ki belongs9 to the set {0, 1}. The probability of success of the task
9Indeed the required total amount of effort for one task in team production is therefore
the same as in the individual production case.
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given the level of effort of the agents is : Pr(X = 1|Ki = k1,Kj = k2) = pk1k2
; i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Like in the previous section, we assume that : p11 > p01 = p10 > p00 ≥ 0.
It is usual in the literature to set the following two properties of the team
production technology. The first one is of course the super-modularity or sub-
modularity.
Definition 7 A production technology is super-modular (respectively sub-modular)
if p11 − p10 ≥ p10 − p00 ( p11 − p10 ≤ p10 − p00 ).
The other property is horizontal technological interdependence which mea-
sures the increase in the probability of success (i.e. in the productivity) when
one agent increases his effort level, for a given effort level of the other team
member. When they are positive, such interdependencies capture the fact that
teamwork makes an employee’s productivity more dependent on the effort ex-
panded by his co-workers10.
Definition 8 The horizontal technological interdependency within team is mea-
sured by the quantity :
∆k = pk1 − pk0
Since we have assume that p11 > p01 = p10 > p00 ≥ 0 then ∆0 = p01 − p00
and ∆1 = p11 − p10 are strictly positive.
3.2 Classical optimal contract
The contract proposed by the principal is composed of two variables: the effort
level required and the corresponding wage. The optimal wage is determined by
the incentive compatible constraints and by the participation constraints. The
participation constraint establishes that the agent’s expected utility must be
at least equal to his reservation utility and the incentive compatible constraint
guarantees that the effort level chosen by the agent maximizes his expected
utility. The participation constraint establishes that the agent’s expected utility
must be at least equal to his reservation utility and the incentive compatible
constraint guarantees that the effort level chosen by the agent maximizes his
expected utility.
In team production, only a global signal is available for the principal. Hence,
he can only propose contracts with symmetric effort levels. w∗k1k2 is the optimal
wage for effort levels k1 et k2 required to agents 1 and 2 with w∗00 = 0 and
w∗11 = u
−1
(
e
p11−p01
)
. In team production, after signing the contract proposed
by the principal, agents make their effort decision in the context of a coordina-
tion game. It is easy to see that this game leads to a unique Nash equilibrium
(1, 1) when ∆1 < ∆0 and to two Nash equilibria (0, 0) and (1, 1) when ∆1 ≥ ∆0.
10According to the empirical studies, innovative organizational practices adopted at the
firm level all tend to make one’s work outcome more sensitive to the others’ efforts rather
than to "individualize" work by isolating workers from one another. The strong requirements
of reorganized firms in terms of quality, time constraints, cost cut devices and delayering
reinforce interactions by eliminating factors facilitating the absorption of local shocks such as
a machine breakdown, a worker tiredness, a supply problem.
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However w∗11 is a decreasing function of ∆1. Hence ceteris paribus, firms will
always prefer organizational forms characterized by both high horizontal inter-
dependencies and super-modularity (∆1 ≥ ∆0) 11. The problem is that in
the case of super-modularity, the equilibrium (1, 1) is no longer unique. There-
fore in order to avoid the implementation of the equilibrium (0, 0), it must be
the case that firms enforce coordination12 among the agents. The issue is not
new and is well documented in the literature: coordination can be obtained
using non-monetary incentives or monetary incentives13. A famous example of
non-monetary incentives is the so-called "peer pressure" by Kandel and Lazear
(1992). We will now show that individual interviews belong to the class of
non-monetary coordinating incentives (and therefore play exactly the same role
-concerning the implementation of the equilibrium (1, 1)- as "peer pressure").
3.3 Ex-ante evaluation interview as a non-monetary in-
centive towards coordination
Firms use individual interviews as a non-monetary incentives device in order
to reach the Pareto-optimal outcome. Indeed in such a moral hazard problem
within team, each agent ignores whether his co-worker shirks or not. Each
individual hence forms beliefs over his partner’s strategy, and chooses an effort
level given these beliefs. As argued by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter
3, section 3.2) the probabilities (Pr(ki = 1) and Pr(ki = 0)) may be interpreted
as the players’ beliefs about their peer’s behavior. Unfortunately, it is easy to see
that the only mixed strategies Nash equilibria are degenerated : ((1, 0), (1, 0))
and ((0, 1), (0, 1)). The meaning is that both agents make an effort decision
ki = 1 (i = 1, 2) only if they are sure that their partner adopts the same
strategy. If the principal wants agents to coordinate on the Pareto-optimal
equilibrium, he must design organizational devices affecting the probabilities
associated with each strategy. This is the reason why we argue in claim 7 that
evaluation interviews represent a mean to generate an ex ante signal towards the
other agents to reinforce their beliefs about the team spirit14. An important
difficulty lies in the fact that the outcome of an evaluation interview is only
known by the principal and the interviewed agent. It is therefore not public. In
turn, it seems hard to figure out how the evaluation interview of an agent i would
generate a signal (regarding himself) towards the other agents j, j 6= i. Though
this may seem counter-intuitive at first sight, we will show that the individual
evaluation interview is such that it does in fact make public the outcome of the
interview. We assume that the interview is run before production takes place
11Indeed let ∆a1 such that ∆
a
1 < ∆0 and ∆
b
1 such that ∆
b
1 ≥ ∆0. We have therefore :
w∗11
`
∆a1
´
> w∗11
`
∆b1
´
.
12By coordination within the team, we mean any instrument which leads to the implemen-
tation of the Nash Pareto-Optimal equilibrium (1, 1).
13Concerning monetary coordinating incentives, when ∆1 ≥ ∆0, the principal can propose a
bonus w∗∗11 which motivates team members to coordinate, where w
∗∗
11 = u
−1
“
e
p01−p00
”
+ε, ε >
0. Of course when ∆1 ≥ ∆0, since u−1
“
e
p01−p00
”
> u−1
“
e
p11−p01
”
and ε > 0 then w∗∗11 (the
coordination incentive bonus) is higher than w∗11. Moreover, the higher the gap between ∆1
and ∆0, the higher the difference w∗∗11− w∗11 : that is to say, the monetary cost of coordination
incentives is increasing with the relative level of horizontal interdependence. Therefore the
monetary cost (for the firms) of coordination incentives is hugh.
14In the sense of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), an agent has team spirit (or loyal) if he does
not shirk when working in a team.
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and that agent i’s type ti ∈ Λi = Λ = {H,L} is a private information where H
= "has team spirit" and L = "has no team spirit". The goal of the interview15
is of course to make agents truthfully reveal their types.
Let now define the following16 mechanism CDG:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1) The interview is run over a population of n individuals, n ≥ 2.
2) The Principal knows (whithout loss of generality-see footnote 16)
the proportion n0n of agents who have team spirit, where n0 ≥ 2.
3) The Principal runs the interview and if he observes that the number
of individuals who declare to be of type H (labeled n̂0 )
is strictly higher than n0, then he knows that at least one individual
(among the n̂0) lies.
In such a case, the Principal stops the process : No team.
4) If n̂0 ≤ n0, the Principal randomly selects two agents among the n̂0
who declare to be of type H.
5) Each interviewed individual only receives the outcome of his own interview.
It is easy to see that if the mechanism17 CDG is common knowledge then:
Claim 7. The mechanism CDG is strategy-proof.
Claim 7 implies that CDG being common knowledge, when the Principal
forms the team, each agent within the team infers that the other team member
has team spirit, even though he does not observe the outcome of the other agent’s
interview. In other words, the mechanism CDG generates public signals18 θi
(i = 1, 2) over the type of each team member. Besides, since CDG is strategy-
proof, such public signals exactly coincide with the tis.
Moreover CDG being common knowledge, when the Principal forms the
team, each agent within the team fully trust in the reliability of the signals
sent. Hence, before making his effort level decision, each agent can observe the
realization of a signal θi ∈ Λ = {H,L} , i = 1, 2, where θi is a random variable
concerning the "team spirit" of player i. Lastly, let us remark that the principal
knows that the agents take w∗11 into account when choosing their optimal effort
levels, so that he keeps on paying the bonus after having observed the agents’
type (H or L). Moreover, it follows directly from the definition of team spirit
that the agents do believe that the signal ti is perfectly correlated with the
15Our approach may be considered as traditional in the sense that it simply consists in elab-
orating a revelation mechanism (see for instance Barbera and Dutta, 2000). Another approach
would consist in allowing a pre-play communication among agents (cheap-talk) during which
the latter mutually send each other private messages over their types, such a communication
being followed by a public checking of the messages sent (see Forges, 1990 ; Barani, 1992 ;
Ben-Porath, 2003).
16If the principal does not know the proportion of agents who have team spirit, then this
proportion is a random variable for him. Let us call it N and let us suppose that the principal
knows its support Sp =
ˆninf
n
,
nsup
n
˜
, with of course ninf ≥ 2. If the principal takes InfSp
as the proportion of agents who have team spirit (that is if the principal is prudent) then the
mechanism CDG is still strategy-proof.
17Of course the mechanism CDG can select people having the same demographic charac-
teristics (gender, age, race,...) either because team spirit is objectively correlated with the
agents’ individual characteristics or because the principal and/or the agents have some prior
beliefs concerning the demographic characteristics of people having team spirit.
18A public signal is not necessarily made explicitely public (by the principal).
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effort variable of agent i, ki, so that when agent i observes θj = H (respectively
θj = L), i 6= j, he believes that kj = 1 (respectively kj = 0) and it is then
optimal to decide ki = 1 (respectively ki = 0). Thus when the mechanism
CDG is implemented, the unique Nash correlated equilibrium is (1, 1). Claim
7 is close in its spirit to a result by Prat (2002) showing that when there is a
positive complementarity between workers in a team then this team should be
composed of agents of the same type.
3.4 Combining an ex-ante individual evaluation interview
with an ex-post one
According to the previous subsection, implementing ex-ante (ex-ante to the
production) an evaluation interview solves the free-riding problem in team by
selecting agents who have team-spirit. However the wage of these agents still
depend to the probability of success of the task p11. As in the individual produc-
tion case, the Principal can implement an ex-post evaluation interview which
aims is to evaluate the level of effort and therefore to condition the wage not on
the success of the task but on the evaluation of the Agents’ effort.
Let γ10 (respectively γ11) be the probability that the Agent’s level of effort
were evaluated as being 1 while his true level of effort is 0 (respectively 1).
Let us assume that γ10 and γ11 are strictly positive; and that the evaluation
system is efficient in detecting a level of effort 1 (that is to say γ10 < γ11).
Then the Principal will maximise his profit p11R− 2
(
γ11 + γ
1
0
)
p , 19 under the
participation and incentives constraints and also under the constraint that his
(the Principal) expected benefit is at least equal to his expected benefit in the
mechanism with only an exante individual evaluation and under the constraint
that the agents’ expected utility is at least equal to their expected utility in the
mechanism with only an exante individual evaluation. Formally we have :
Max
p,γ11 ,γ
1
0
p11R− 2
(
γ11 + γ
1
0
)
p
Constraints
γ11u (p)− e ≥ 0
γ11u (p)− e ≥ γ10u (p)
γ11u (p)− e ≥ p11u (w∗11)− e
p11R− 2
(
γ11 + γ
1
0
)
p ≥ p11 (R− 2w∗11)
It is easy to see that this program has two solutions:
• If p11p11−p10 >
γ11
γ11−γ10 then p = u
−1
[
p11
γ11
× ep11−p10
]
with γ11 and γ10 such
that :
u−1
[
p11
γ11
× e
p11 − p10
]
≤ p11
γ11 + γ
1
0
× u−1
[
e
p11 − p10
]
• If p11p11−p10 ≤
γ11
γ11−γ10 then p = u
−1
[
e
γ11−γ10
]
with γ11 and γ10 such that :
u−1
[
e
γ11 − γ10
]
≤ p11
γ11 + γ
1
0
× u−1
[
e
p11 − p10
]
19Where p¯ is the Agent’s wage when he has been evaluated as having provide the level of
effort 1.
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For each solution, the Principal can implement two kind of policy: either p
(the agent’s wage in the incentive mechanism with exante and expost evalua-
tions) ≥ w∗11 (the agent’s wage in the incentive mechanism with only an exante
evaluation) and γ11 + γ10 (the probability of getting p) ≤ p11 (the probability
of getting w∗11) or p < w∗11 and γ11 + γ10 > p11. For instance, in the case of
p = u−1
[
p11
γ11
× ep11−p10
]
, if the Principal designs the mechanism in such a way
that p11 ≥ γ11 then p will be greater than w∗11, however the probability of getting
p will be weaker than the probability of getting w∗11 (γ11+γ10 ≤ p11). Likewise, if
the Principal designs the mechanism in such a way that p11 < γ11 then p will be
weaker than w∗11, however the probability of getting p will be greater than the
probability of getting w∗11 (γ11+γ10 > p11). In the case of p = u−1
[
e
γ11−γ10
]
, if the
Principal designs the mechanism in such a way that γ11 − γ10 ≤ p11 − p10 then
p will be greater than w∗11, however the probability of getting p will be weaker
than the probability of getting w∗11 (γ11 + γ10 ≤ p11). Likewise, if the Principal
designs the mechanism in such a way that γ11 − γ10 > p11 − p10 then p will be
weaker than w∗11, however the probability of getting p will be greater than the
probability of getting w∗11 (γ11 + γ10 > p11).
However we think that the Principal will implement a mechanism in which
p ≥ w∗11 and γ11 + γ10 ≤ p11 instead of a mechanism with p < w∗11 and γ11 + γ10 >
p11. The reason is that in the former, the effect of the selection effect on the
Principal’s effective expected profit will be higher. Indeed the smaller is γ11 +γ10
the higher will be the agent’s effort in order to increase the probability
k∑
i=0
γ1i
to be evaluated playing an effort equal to 1. We can remark that concerning
the selection effect, if γ12 − γ11 ≥ γ11 − γ10 (that is if the evaluation technology is
super-modular) then all the agents will play the level of effort k = 2 (instead
of the required k = 1)20. More generally, if the evaluation system includes an
informal sytem of detection system of an illegal level of work (k ≥ 3) then the
agents of type θ < (
γ1k−γ11)u(p¯)−e
ke will play an effort k ≥ 3.
4 Empirical tests
This section deals with the tests of the predictions listed in table 4.1 by mobiliz-
ing a French matched employer / employee database. Since the predictions con-
cern causal inferences about the relative effects of evaluation interviews which
can be viewed as a treatment and the data available is not based on the results
of carefully conducted randomized experiment, propensity score analysis seems
to be an appropriate tool.
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.1 briefly presents the data.
Subsection 4.2 summarizes propensity score methodology. The results of data
analysis are described in subsection 4.3.
20And if the revenue R is high enough
„
i.e. R ≥ γ
1
2p
p22−p11
«
then this overintensifisation of
work will increase the Principal’s effective expected profit.
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Table 4.1: Predictions
Prediction 1 The agents’ level of effort in incentive scheme with individual evaluation
interview is higher than the level of effort
in the classical incentive scheme.
Prediction 2 An incentive mechanism with evaluation interview always includes
in addition to the normal incentive effect,
a high selection effect whose consequence
is to attract the agents whose disutility of effort is the weaker.
Prediction 3 Evaluation interviews are associated with belief
regarding the Agent’s ability to predict his wage.
Prediction 4 Evaluation interviews are associated with monetary
gains for employees.
4.1 The Data
We use the COI survey which is a matched employer/employee survey on Com-
puterization and Organizational Change (survey "Changements Organisation-
nels et Informatisation"), conducted in 1997 by the French ministries of Labor
(DARES), Industry (SESSI), Trade and Services (SCEES) and the French Na-
tional Institute of Statistics (INSEE) and conceived and coordinated by the
Centre d’Etudes de l’Emploi. In this survey, both employer representatives and
small sample of randomly selected employees within firms (2 or 3 per firm) are
interviewed. For a detailed description of the survey, see Greenan and Hamon-
Cholet (2001).
Our analysis focuses on the sample of firms over 50 employees in the manu-
facturing industry. We select a sub-sample of 290421 employees. Interviewed
employees belong to the core workforce of the firm because they all have at least
1 year of seniority. The labor force section of COI survey includes questions
about collective work which allow to build up five different measures of interac-
tions between employees in the course of the work process (see appendix 1 for
detailed questions). Table 4.2 displays the distribution of the dummy variables
associated with these measures. These different measures are correlated but
not equivalent. Therefore the breakdown of workers between individuals and
collective workers depends on the measure used. Actually we think that each
measure contributes to define collective work taking into account the varieties of
work organization. Consequently, we build up a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 (the value 0) if at least (less than) 3 dummies takes the value 1. Accord-
ing to this variable we have 1537 individual workers and 1367 collective workers.
Table 4.3 gives the distribution of individual evaluation interviews according
to our synthetic binary indicator of collective work. About 15% and about 22%
of evaluated workers are respectively individual workers and collective work-
ers while there are more individual workers (i.e, 52.9%) than collective workers
(47.1%).
21In the full sample there are 4295 individuals. However in our analysis we do not take into
account employees with supervision activities (1214 individuals) or employees working part
time (177 individuals). The former combine a position of Principal and of Agent that we have
not investigated theoretically, while part time leads to badly measured effort and wages.
20
Table 4.2: Five measures of interactions between employees in the course of the
work process a
Frequency Percent
measure 1:
Teamwork
No (0) 1422 48.97
Yes (1) 1482 51.03
measure 2:
Time spent in teamwork
Less than 1/4 (0) 2045 70.42
1/4 or more (1) 859 29.58
measure 3
Communication in the firm
Weak (0) 1019 35.09
Strong (1) 1885 64.91
measure 4:
Benefit from others’ help
Weak (0) 1537 52.93
Strong (1) 1367 47.07
measure 5:
Participation into meetings
Weak (0) 1557 53.62
Strong (1) 1347 46.38
a See A. of appendix 1 for the construction of these measures.
Table 4.3: Evaluation among individual workers and collective workers
Individual Workers Collective Workers
Evaluation
Yes 445 (15.32%)a 637 (21.9%)
No 1092 (37.6%) 730 (25.13%)
Total 1537(52.9%) 1367(47.1%)
a Percentage with respect to the analysed subsample of 2904 employees.
At this stage a simple way to test our predictions is to consider evaluation
interviews as treatments and to evaluate the effect of this treatment on the
chosen variables for measuring effort, wages, and beliefs about wages. More
precisely, let t a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employee declares being
evaluated and 0 otherwise, then 3 quantities are interesting for us. The first is
the average treatment effect over the whole population, written C; the second
is the average treatment effect over the treated individuals, written C1; and the
third is the average treatment effect over the non treated individuals, written
C0.
More precisely, let Y the chosen variables for measuring effort, wages, and beliefs
about wages. Then C measures the variation of Y that would be observed
if the whole population was treated; C1 is an evaluation of the effect of the
treatment in the usual sense since it concerns the treated population; and C0
is a prospective evaluation in the sense that it measures what would happen if
the non treated population was treated. Thus, we have:
C = E[Y1 − Y0] (4.1)
C1 = E[Y1 − Y0|t = 1] (4.2)
21
C0 = E[Y1 − Y0|t = 0] (4.3)
Where Y1 is the observed value of Y that results when receiving treatment (that
is when being evaluated), Y0 is the observed value of Y that results when do not
receiving treatment (that is when do not being evaluated), and E[ . ] denotes
expectation in the population.
Intuitively, an estimate of an average treatment effect could be the difference
between the average of Y over the population of treated individuals and its
average over the population of non treated individuals, that is,
Y 1 − Y 0 (4.4)
Where Y 1 and Y 0 are respectively the average of Y for treated (evaluated em-
ployees) and the non treated (non evaluated employees).
This estimate is given in table 4.4 for a set of variables from the labor force
section of the COI survey (see appendix 1 for more details on the underly-
ing questions). We find that differences in these variables between evaluated
and non evaluated employees are all significatively positives. In particular: ac-
cording to prediction 1 there are more evaluated employees than non-evaluated
employees that work sometimes more than ordinarily, that make propositions
to improve the work process, and they show on average a greater level of effort;
according to prediction 3 evaluated employees have a greater ability to predict
their wages; according to prediction 4 an evaluated employee earn on average
12.46 % more than a non evaluated one. Note however that for collective work-
ers the evaluation effects are slightly weaker with a difference between evaluated
and non evaluated employees that work sometimes more than ordinarily which
is no more significant.
However, broadly speaking the main problem when evaluating the effect of a
treatment is that for each individual we only observe
Y = t× Y1 + t× Y0 =
{
Y1 if t = 1
Y0 if t = 0
Then it can be shown that the comparison of means between treated and non
treated individuals can be the cause of a selection bias since the data does not re-
sult from a randomized experiment. And when testing evaluation effects (on ef-
fort, wage, beliefs about wages) there is a need to control for naturally occurring
systematic differences in background characteristics between the treated pop-
ulation and the non treated population, which would not occur in the context
of a randomized experiment. Moreover, according to prediction 2, individual
evaluation interview affects employees effort trough a selection effect associated
to disutility and an incentive effect which in our case is estimated by the av-
erage treatment (evaluation) effect. Therefore in order to estimate the average
treatment (evaluation) effect it is also necessary to control for the selection bias
due to disutility. Although, it seems difficult to control "directly" for this selec-
tion effect because disutility is not an observable characteristic, we can assume
that disutility is grounded on observable background characteristics, and hence
controlling for them allows to control for the selection effect due to disutility.
Thus it is necessary to control for background characteristics in order to es-
timate the effect of individual evaluation interview. And our choice is to use
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the propensity score methodology introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
which addresses this situation by reducing the entire collection of background
characteristics to a single "composite" characteristic that appropriately sum-
marizes the collection.
Table 4.4. Average differences between evaluated and no evaluated workers
Individual workers Collective workers
Working more than ordinarilya
evaluated 0.5169 0.5965
no evaluated 0.4478 0.5795
difference b 0.069∗∗c (13.34 %) 0.017 (2.84 %)
Employee’s propositions to improve the work processd
evaluated 0.5978 0.7928
no evaluated 0.4661 0.6575
difference 0.132∗∗∗ (22.03 %) 0.135∗∗∗ (17.06 %)
Employee’s efforte
evaluated 0.2628 0.3444
no evaluated 0.2213 0.2743
difference 0.042∗∗∗ (15.79 %) 0.07∗∗∗ (20.3 %)
Annual net wage
evaluated 16853 18027
no evaluated 14751 15780
difference 2101 ∗∗∗ (12.46 %) 2247∗∗∗ (12.46%)
Annual net wage in logarithm
evaluated 9.6525 9.7181
no evaluated 9.5279 9.6029
difference 0.125 ∗∗∗ (1.295 %) 0.115∗∗∗ (1.18%)
Employee’s ability to predict his wagef
evaluated 0.611 0.6724
no evaluated 0.442 0.5384
difference 0.169∗∗∗ (27.65 %) 0.134∗∗∗ (19.92 %)
a Response is either "yes" or "no".
b ∗∗∗ p− value < 0.01, ∗∗ 0.01 ≤ p− value < 0.05, ∗ 0.05 ≤ p− value < 0.1
c Percentage of average response variable for evaluated workers is in parentheses.
d Response is either "yes" or "no".
e See B. of appendix 1 for the construction of this variable.
f See C. of appendix 1 for the construction of this variable.
4.2 Propensity score methodology
Propensity score technology allows to correct the selection bias by matching in-
dividuals according to their propensity score which is the estimated probability
of receiving treatment (of being evaluated) given background characteristics.
Moreover, the results of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) allow to construct a
group of treated individuals and a group of non treated ones comparables in
accordance to their propensity score. And we can use a non parametric Kernel
matching estimator proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998)
which under some regularity assumptions is convergent and asymptotically nor-
mal.
Broadly speaking, in this estimator each non treated individual takes part in
the construction of a counterfactual of each treated individual, that is to say of
an estimate of what would be the response for the treated individual if he was in
the non treated population. And the importance of each non treated individual
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in this construction varies as the distance between his propensity score and that
of the treated individual.
Moreover, since in order to estimate the treatment effect we have to construct
for each treated individual a counterfactual from individuals in the non treated
population, we must have a set of non treated individuals which have propensi-
ties scores close to the propensity score of the treated individual. In other words
a counterfactual can only be constructed for the individuals whose propensity
score belongs to the intersection between the support of the propensity score
distribution of the treated individuals and the support of the propensity score
distribution of the non treated individuals. Consequently an important point
in the estimation concerns the determination of the common support of the
propensity score distributions. Thus, the estimation proceeds as follows:
• The propensity score is estimated from a logistic model. That is, treat-
ment (evaluation) is the explained variable, background characteristics
are the explanatory variables, and the estimated probability of receiving
treatment given background characteristics is the propensity score.
• The common support is computed as the intersection between the propen-
sity score for the treated group and the propensity score for the control
group.
• We estimate the treatment causal effect using a non parametric Kernel
matching estimator proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997,
1998).
• The estimate standard deviation is computed by bootstrap.
4.3 Results
Logistic regression results
Appendix 3 presents the parameters estimated of the logistic model for the
binary outcome "evaluated/not evaluated". These results give evidence about
the existence of a selection bias insofar as it appears that for individual workers
and for team workers, interview evaluation is not randomly implemented. How-
ever differences appears between them.
More precisely, in the case of individual workers we find ceteris paribus that
among the socio-demographic characteristics of the employee that we have take
into account, being in the firm since 1 to 2 years (rather than since 11 years
or more) and having a middle management professional type (rather than an
unskilled one) have a positive and significative effect on the probability of be-
ing evaluated with p-values of respectively 0.0079 and 0.0011. We find, with a
lower degree of significativity (0.01<p-value< 0.05) that being a women have
a negative effect on the probability of being evaluated, while being in the firm
since 7 to 10 years (rather than since 11 years or more), and having an executive
professional type (rather than an unskilled one) have positives effects on this
probability.
Among the general characteristics of the firm, a firm size of 1000 employees and
more (rather than 99 and less) have a positive effect on the probability of being
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evaluated with a p-value of 0.0140. There are 5 industry sectors with significa-
tive and positive effects on the probability of being evaluated: pharmaceutical,
perfumes, and cleaning products with a p-value<0.0001; chemicals, rubber, and
plastic products with a p-value of 0.0166, electrical and electronic equipment
with a p-value of 0.0433, electrical and electronic components with a p-value of
0.0271; and shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway with a p-value of 0.0814.
There is only one other variable with a significative effect on the probability of
being evaluated. It is the ISO 9001, ISO 9002, EAQF Certification which have
a positive effect on this probability. Its p-value is 0.0034.
In the case of team workers the socio-demographic characteristics with signi-
ficatives effects on the probability of being evaluated are not the same than
those in the case of individual workers. Indeed, for team workers it is a second
level of education, and a third level of education (rather than " with no degree")
which increases the probability of being evaluated with p-values respectively of
respectively 0.06, and 0.04. Among the general characteristics of the firm a firm
size of 500 to 999 employees (rather than 99 and less) have a positive effect on
the probability of being evaluated with a p-value of 0.0007. There are 3 indus-
try sectors having a significative effect on the probability of being evaluated:
printing, press, publishing (p-value of 0.0577); chemicals, rubber, and plastic
products (p-value of 0.0091 ); pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products
(p-value of 0.0006); shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway (p-value of 0.00915). The
first and latest of these sectors have a negative effect on the probability of being
evaluated while as in the case of individual workers the other two sectors have
a positive effect.
A firm computerization intensity of 2 and of 3 have a postitive and significative
effect on the probability of being evaluated with p-values of respectively, 0.0786
and 0.0320. There are also two organizational practices of the firm which have
both a positive effect on the probability of being evaluated. The first is the ISO
9001, ISO 9002, EAQF Certification (p-value of 0.0108), and the second the
5S method or Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) method (p-value of 0.0086).
Finally, a share of production workers participating in problem solving groups
of respectively "10% to 50%" and "50% and more" have a positive and signi-
ficative effect on the probability of being evaluated with p-values of respectively
0.0122 and 0.0166.
Propensity score results in the case of individual production
The first estimate we have to consider is that of C1 since it measures an
average treatment effect in the usual sense (that is over the treated population).
In this case we find that all the effects are positive but that the only significa-
tive ones, for a level less than 10%, are the effect on the variable employee’s
proposition to improve the work process which is significative at the 1% level,
and the effect on the variable employee’s ability to predict his wage which is also
significative at the 1% level. Hence the first result goes in the sense of prediction
1, and the second result in the sense of prediction 3. Moreover the fact that the
effect on the two other variables measuring effort is no longer significative but
that it remains positive, indicates that there is high selection effect, although it
is impossible with our methodology to say what in this selection effect is due to
the disutility of effort.
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The estimation of C and C0 gives effects that are all positive. And they are
significative for the following variables: working more than ordinarily (signi-
ficative at the 10% level), employee’s proposition to improve the work process
(significative at the 1% level), employee’s effort (significative at the 5% level),
and employee’s ability to predict his wage (significative at the 1% level).
Table 4.5: Propensity score estimates of average treatments effects (ATE) for
individual workers
estimates stda student
global ATE (C)
Working more than ordinarily 0.057959 0.030 1.77354
Employee’s propositions to improve the work process 0.11393 0.033 3.45566
Employee’s effort 0.039254 0.017 2.15004
Annual net wage 143.002 380.032 0.52957
Annual net wage in logarithm 0.012790 0.022 0.80632
Employee’s ability to predict his wage 0.14785 0.020 7.22552
ATE on evaluated workers (C1)
Working more than ordinarily 0.056438 0.032 1.52169
Employee’s proposition to improve the work process 0.094715 0.033 2.85082
Employee’s effort 0.033579 0.628 0.29807
Annual net wage 298.586 427.125 0.77281
Annual net wage in logarithm 0.022008 0.023 1.08989
Employee’s ability to predict his wage 0.14863 0.021 6.96854
ATE on non evaluated workers (C0)
Working more than ordinarily 0.058587 0.031 1.74328
Employee’s proposition to improve the work process 0.12186 0.035 3.46067
Employee’s effort 0.041596 0.019 2.14896
Annual net wage 78.7760 394.627 0.37427
Annual net wage in logarithm .008985076 0.024 0.62366
Employee’s ability to predict his wage 0.14753 0.021 6.82398
a Standard deviation is computed using bootstrap with 300 simulations
Support over 300 simulations: min = 1352; max = 1501; mean = 1426.48
Propensity score results in the case of team production
In the case of C1 all the effects are positive and outside the case of the vari-
ableWorking more than ordinarily these effects are significative. More precisely,
the effects on the variables Employee’s propositions to improve the work process,
Employee’s effort, and Employee’s ability to predict his wage are significative at
the 1% level, and the effects on the Annual net wage and on the Annual net
wage in logarithm are significative at the 5% level. Hence these results go in
the sense of predictions 1, 3, and 4. And we can also observe that the effects
are lesser than those obtained by average difference indicating that there is a
selection effect.
In the case of C and C0 the previous effects are also observed. However, in
these two cases the effect on the variable Working more than ordinarily is neg-
ative and for C0, it is significative at the 1% level. Moreover in this latter case
the effect on the Annual net wage in logarithm is no longer significative.
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Table 4.6: Propensity score estimates of average treatments effects (ATE) for
team workers
estimates stda student
global ATE (C)
Working more than ordinarily -.001461069 0.030 0.20169
Employee’s propositions to improve the work process 0.092088 0.028 3.06834
Employee’s effort 0.064261 0.015 4.19518
Annual net wage 985.993 428.112 2.04036
Annual net wage in logarithm 0.041866 0.020 1.88218
Employee’s ability to predict his wage 0.10508 0.019 5.57450
ATE on evaluated workers (C1)
Working more than ordinarily .002398046 0.031 0.09683
Employee’s proposition to improve the work process 0.10179 0.030 3.24448
Employee’s effort 0.065878 0.016 4.35131
Annual net wage 1308.04 533.770 2.03018
Annual net wage in logarithm 0.057090 0.022 2.18520
Employee’s ability to predict his wage 0.099549 0.020 5.07651
ATE on non evaluated workers (C0)
Working more than ordinarily -.004679831 0.019 5.57450
Employee’s proposition to improve the work process 0.083995 0.030 2.51172
Employee’s effort 0.062912 0.016 3.64055
Annual net wage 717.382 401.551 1.74526
Annual net wage in logarithm 0.029168 0.021 1.36110
Employee’s ability to predict his wage 0.10969 0.020 5.38851
a Standard deviation is computed using bootstrap with 300 simulations
Support over 300 simulations: min = 1124; max = 1304; mean = 1229.03
Before concluding let us consider the table 4.7 where C, C1, and C0 are ranked.
In the case of individual production we observe that for all the variable measur-
ing the employee’s effort we have C0 > C > C1, while for the variables concern-
ing wage and the employee’s ability to predict his wage we have C1 > C > C0.
Hence in the former case although the effect of the individual evaluation inter-
view is positive it would be greater if it had concerned the whole population
and the population of non evaluated workers. And in the latter case the effect
of evaluation will be lesser over the whole population and the population of non
evaluated workers than its effect over the population of evaluated workers.
In the case of team production outside the the case where C1 and C0 are
negative and the effect on the employee’s ability to predict his wage, we have
C1 > C > C0.
Table 4.7: Ranking of estimates of C, C1, and C0
Individual production Team production
Working more than ordinarily C0 > C > C1 C > C1 > C0
with C1,C0 < 0
Employee’s propositions to improve the work process C0 > C > C1 C1 > C > C0
Employee’s effort C0 > C > C1 C1 > C > C0
Annual net wage C1 > C > C0 C1 > C > C0
Annual net wage in logarithm C1 > C > C0 C1 > C > C0
Employee’s ability to predict his wage C1 > C > C0 C0 > C > C1
5 conclusion
In this paper we proposed a theoretical framework based on a Principal-Agent
model with subjective evaluation of effort through an individual interview. It
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allowed us to analyze the effects of the implementation of an incentive mech-
anism with individual evaluation interview over the employee’s level of effort,
over his wage, and his beliefs regarding his wage. We derived four predictions.
First, evaluation interviews have a positive impact on effort. Second, evaluation
interviews increase the effort through two effects: the classical incentive effect
and also a high selection effect. Third, evaluation interviews are associated with
positive beliefs regarding wage and work recognition. Finally, evaluation inter-
views are associated with monetary gains for employees. The tests have been
implemented using a propensity score methodology which allows to control for
selection effects due to background characteristics. The effects of evaluation
interview are weaker than those obtained without control of background char-
acteristics indicating selection effects. Nonetheless in most cases, we get the
predicted effects of evaluation interviews. In particular, the effect of evalua-
tion interview on effort is positive and frequently significative, and the effect on
beliefs regarding wage is always positive and significative. Finally we want to
stress that the selection effect that we calculate is a simply proxy of the theoret-
ical selection effect set in sections 2 and 3 (according to the latter, firms which
implement evaluation interviews attract people whose disutility of effort is the
weaker).
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Appendix 1: Variables constructed from the labor force
section of the COI survey
A. Measures of Collective Work.
Measure 1: Teamwork
This measure is associated to the question asked to the employees: "Do you
sometimes do your work in group or collectively?"
Responses are either "yes" or "no".
Measure 2: Time spent in teamwork
This measure is constructed from the question asked to employees: "How
much of your working time does work in group or collectively takes?
Almost all the time,
more than a quarter of your time,
less than a quarter of your time".
Measure 3: Communication in the firm
This measure is constructed from the following 4 questions asked to the
employees: "Apart from your superiors, are there other persons that give you
indications on what you have to do? (responses are either "yes" or "no", or it
does not apply)
(1) "Colleagues you usually work with?"
(2) "Other persons or departments in the firm?"
"Apart from your subordinates do you give indications to other persons on what
they have to do? (responses are either "yes" or "no", or it does not apply)
(3) "Colleagues you usually work with?"
(4) "Other persons or departments in the firm?"
Then a "Weak" communication corresponds to only 0 or only 1 answer "yes"
among these 4 questions, and a "Strong" communication to at least 2 answers
"yes" among the 4 questions.
Measure 4: Benefit from others’ help
The measure is constructed from the following 3 questions asked to the
employees: "If you have a temporary excess workload or if you are uneasy with
a difficult task are you helped by..." (responses are either "yes" or "no", or it
does not apply)
(1) "Your superiors?"
(2) "Colleagues you usually work with?"
(3) "Other persons or departments in the firm?"
Then a "Weak" benefit from others’ help corresponds to 0 or only 1 answer
"yes" and a "Strong" benefit from others’ help at least 2 answers "yes" among
the 3 questions.
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Measure 5: Participation into meetings
The measure is constructed from the question asked to the employees: "How
frequently do you participate into meetings in the context of your work? (at
least once a year)
Then a "Weak" participation into meetings corresponds to 0 or only one meeting
a year and a "Strong" participation into meetings corresponds to at least 2
meetings a year.
B. Employee’s effort.
This variable is built from the answers to the followings 5 questions asked
to the whole sample of employees:
(1) "do you work more than ordinarily?" (response is either "yes" or "no");
(2) "do you work less than ordinarily?" (responses is either "yes" or "no" or it
does not apply);
(3) "do you work more than ordinarily for personals reasons?" (responses is ei-
ther "yes" or "no" or it does not apply);
(4) "do you work less than ordinarily for personals reasons?" (responses is either
"yes" or "no" or it does not apply);
(5) "do you do propositions in order to improve the work process?" (response
is either "yes" or "no").
Employee’s effort is then the ratio of the number of "yes" given to these 5
questions to the number of questions where the employee answered "yes" or
"no".
C. Employee’s ability to predict his wage
This variable is built from the answers to the 8 questions asked to whole
sample of employees: "Which elements have an influence on your wage or on
your promotion"? ( for each element response is either "yes" or "no" or it does
not apply):
(1) to do a high-quality work;
(2) to carry assignments to the letter;
(3) to be in good terms with the boss (bosses);
(4) to be in good terms with the colleague(s),
(5) To take up training courses,
(6) to learn how to use new technologies;
(7) The firm’s performances;
(8) other reasons.
Employee’s ability to predict his wage is then the ratio of the number of "yes"
to the number of questions where the employee answered "yes" or "no".
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Appendix 2: Variables constructed from the Firm section
of the COI survey
A. Firms’ computerization intensity
This variable in constructed from the question near to the firms:
"did/do your firm realize/ realized data transfers by means a computer inter-
face" (responses are either "yes" or "no"):
(1) "within the management service?"
(2) "between management and production service?"
(3) "between management and suppliers, subcontractors?"
(4) "between management and client firms?"
(5) "between management et social organisms public power?"
(6) "between conception services and production ?"
(7) "between conception and suppliers, subcontractors?"
(8) "Within the production services or between manufacture unities?"
(9) "between production and suppliers, subcontractors?"
(10) "between production and client firms?"
Then intensity 1 corresponds to 0 or 1 "yes"; intensity 2 corresponds to 2 or 3
"yes"; intensity 3 corresponds to 4 or 5 "yes"; and intensity 4 corresponds to 5
or more than 5 "yes". Reference is then intensity 1.
B. Average number of task each type of individual is responsible
for (NMT)
This variable is constructed from the question asked to the firms: "In gen-
eral who is/was authorized in 1997 to...(more than 1 answer possible among
Management/Production Worker/Specialist)":
(1) adjust installations;
(2) perform first level maintenance;
(3) allocate tasks to production workers;
(4) inspect quality of supplies;
(5) inspect quality of production;
(6) participate in performance improvements;
(7) participate in project teams;
(8) stop production in case of an incident;
(9) troubleshoot in case of an incident;
(10) start production again in case of an incident.
The qualitative variable NMT with 4 items is constructed as follows:
NMT ≥ 1.7 (joint responsibility of indirect task)
1.4 ≤ NMT < 1.7 (medium sharing of responsibility)
1 < NMT ≤ 1.4 (low sharing of responsibility)
NTM ≤ 1 (disjoined responsibilities).
And reference is NTM ≤ 1.
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Appendix 3: Logistic regression results for the binary
outcome "Evaluated/Not evaluated"
A. The case of individual production.
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.0329 0.3485 34.0305 <.0001
Socio-demographic characteristics
of the employee
•Gendera -0.2524 0.1519 2.7595 0.0967
•Ageb :
15 to 24 -0.1760 0.4762 0.1366 0.7116
25 to 39 -0.0446 0.1963 0.0515 0.8205
40 to 49 0.2130 0.1865 1.3044 0.2534
•Years in the firmc :
1 to 2 0.6301 0.2374 7.0452 0.0079
3 to 6 0.2496 0.1952 1.6355 0.2010
7 to 10 0.3229 0.1756 3.3827 0.0659
•Level of educationd:
Vocational training (CAP and BEP) -0.0175 0.1503 0.0135 0.9074
Second level education (BAC) -0.0885 0.2581 0.1177 0.7316
Third level education -0.0496 0.2607 0.0363 0.8489
•Professional typee:
Executives 0.6554 0.3603 3.3089 0.0689
Middle management 0.7697 0.2356 10.6728 0.0011
Clerk 0.3463 0.2461 1.9801 0.1594
Skilled blue collar -0.0568 0.1670 0.1156 0.7339
General characteristics of the firm
•Firm sizef :
100 to 499 -0.0328 0.1744 0.0355 0.8506
500 to 999 0.0294 0.2264 0.0168 0.8968
1000 and more 0.6202 0.2525 6.0334 0.0140
•Industry sectorg :
Mineral products 0.4561 0.3481 1.7165 0.1901
Textile 0.4668 0.3269 2.0391 0.1533
Clothing and leather -0.2872 0.4127 0.4845 0.4864
Wood and paper 0.1410 0.3348 0.1773 0.6737
Printing, press, publishing 0.2648 0.3902 0.4605 0.4974
Production of propellants and fuels 1.0360 1.4831 0.4880 0.4848
Chemicals, rubber, and plastic products 0.6593 0.2753 5.7342 0.0166
Pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products 1.7797 0.3673 23.4742 <.0001
Foundry and metal work products -0.0104 0.2843 0.0013 0.9709
Mechanical engineering 0.1636 0.2718 0.3625 0.5471
Household equipment 0.0894 0.3122 0.0821 0.7745
Electrical and electronic equipment 0.9187 0.4546 4.0840 0.0433
Electrical and electronic components 0.6605 0.2988 4.8870 0.0271
Automobile 0.3523 0.3630 0.9420 0.3318
Shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway 0.6672 0.3829 3.0367 0.0814
a Reference is "men".
b Reference is "50 and more".
c Reference is "11 and more".
d Reference is "with no degree except CEP or BEPC".
e Reference is "unskilled blue collar".
f Reference is "99 and less".
g Reference is "food industries".
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Appendix 3: Logistic regression results for the individual workers case
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Firms’ computerization intensityh
intensity 2 0.0295 0.1914 0.0238 0.8773
intensity 3 0.1274 0.2034 0.3923 0.5311
intensity 4 0.0664 0.2266 0.0860 0.7694
Obstacles to the organizational changes
Tensions between the servicesi -0.2390 0.1760 1.8428 0.1746
Tensions with the shareholdersi 0.0501 0.2123 0.0558 0.8133
Difficulties in the relations with the other firmsi 0.0393 0.1899 0.0429 0.8359
Difficulties to school or to reclassify the staffi -0.0221 0.1621 0.0186 0.8915
Non executive staff adaptations and
establishment problemsi -0.0908 0.1751 0.2688 0.6041
Executive staff adaptations and
establishment problemsi 0.2754 0.1679 2.6886 0.1011
Clashes with the staff (petitions, strikes,...)i -0.0970 0.2035 0.2271 0.6337
Use of new organizational devices
ISO 9001, ISO 9002, EAQF Certificationj 0.4734 0.1616 8.5854 0.0034
Other certification or total
quality managementj 0.0457 0.1394 0.1073 0.7432
Value analysis, functional analysis,
or "AMDEC" methodj 0.00832 0.1633 0.0026 0.9593
5S method or Total Productive Maintenance
(TPM) methodj 0.2457 0.1768 1.9307 0.1647
Organization in profit centersj 0.1212 0.1398 0.7517 0.3859
Formal in-house customer/ supplier contractsj 0.0257 0.1402 0.0335 0.8547
System of "Just in time" deliveryj 0.1323 0.1786 0.5483 0.4590
System of "Just in time" productionj -0.0757 0.1793 0.1785 0.6727
Evolution in hierarchical layers
between 1994 and 1997k
1 and more -0.0725 0.2648 0.0750 0.7842
-1 -0.1617 0.1748 0.8556 0.3550
-2 and less 0.1750 0.2874 0.3707 0.5426
Team work
•Share of production workers participating
in self managed teamsl:
10% to 50% -0.1373 0.1965 0.4879 0.4849
50% and more 0.1451 0.2585 0.3149 0.5747
•Share of production workers participating
in problem solving groupsl:
10% to 50% 0.3005 0.1927 2.4314 0.1189
50% and more 0.5594 0.3928 2.0281 0.1544
• Share of production workers participating
in project teamsl:
10% to 50% 0.1398 0.1958 0.5101 0.4751
50% and more -0.9496 0.5843 2.6415 0.1041
•Share of others workers participating
in self managed teamsl:
10% to 50% 0.1439 0.2051 0.4921 0.4830
50% and more -0.1158 0.3478 0.1108 0.7392
h Reference is "intensity 1". See A. of appendix 2 for the construction of this variable.
i The variable is equal to 1 when the firms states that such an obstacle has been either "quite
important", or "important", or "very important", and 0 when she states that it has been
"unimportant".
j Response is either "yes" or "no".
k Reference is "0".
l Reference 10 % and less.
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Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
•Share of others workers participating
in problem solving groupsl:
10% to 50% -0.1922 0.2010 0.9143 0.3390
50% and more -0.0789 0.3770 0.0438 0.8343
•Share of others workers participating
in project teamsl:
10% to 50% -0.2005 0.1941 1.0673 0.3016
50% and more 0.3645 0.3384 1.1598 0.2815
•Who is/was authorized in 1997
to participate in project teams?:
Managementm -0.2209 0.1608 1.8877 0.1695
Production workerm 0.0596 0.1448 0.1694 0.6806
Specialistm -0.2073 0.1627 1.6232 0.2027
•Average number of task each type
of individual is responsible forn:
1.1 to 1.4 -0.0469 0.1864 0.0635 0.8011
1.5 to 1.7 0.1619 0.2226 0.5292 0.4669
1.8 and more 0.3439 0.2386 2.0764 0.1496
l Reference 10 % and less.
m Response is either "yes" or "no".
n Reference is ≤ 1. See B. of appendix 2 for the construction of the variable.
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B. The case of team production.
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -1.7432 0.3745 21.6633 <.0001
Socio-demographic characteristics
of the employee
•Gendera -0.1403 0.1523 0.8481 0.3571
•Ageb:
15 to 24 0.5015 0.4257 1.3880 0.2387
25 to 39 0.2781 0.2295 1.4691 0.2255
40 to 49 0.2781 0.2295 1.4691 0.2255
•Years in the firmc:
1 to 2 -0.2096 0.2443 0.7363 0.3908
3 to 6 0.1818 0.1820 0.9972 0.3180
7 to 10 0.0170 0.1730 0.0097 0.9217
•Level of educationd:
Vocational training (CAP and BEP) 0.1829 0.1567 1.3621 0.2432
Second level education (BAC) 0.4481 0.2421 3.4263 0.0642
Third level education 0.5279 0.2645 3.9823 0.0460
•Professional typee:
Executives 0.5416 0.3485 2.4147 0.1202
Middle management 0.1200 0.2284 0.2761 0.5993
Clerk -0.0121 0.2972 0.0017 0.9675
Skilled blue collar -0.1469 0.1743 0.7101 0.3994
General characteristics of the firm
•Firm sizef :
100 to 499 0.3510 0.1765 3.9524 0.0468
500 to 999 0.7059 0.2080 11.5179 0.0007
1000 and more 0.1941 0.2422 0.6426 0.4228
•Industry sectorg :
Mineral products -0.2853 0.3202 0.7942 0.3728
Textile 0.3355 0.4096 0.6708 0.4128
Clothing and leather -0.1220 0.3734 0.1068 0.7439
Wood and paper -0.4769 0.3661 1.6974 0.1926
Printing, press, publishing -0.8333 0.4390 3.6032 0.0577
Production of propellants and fuels 1.2745 0.9040 1.9877 0.1586
Chemicals, rubber, and plastic products 0.6759 0.2593 6.7962 0.0091
Pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products 1.2302 0.3578 11.8237 0.0006
Foundry and metal work products -0.2956 0.2752 1.1535 0.2828
Mechanical engineering -0.0338 0.2637 0.0164 0.8980
Household equipment 0.1161 0.3083 0.1418 0.7065
Electrical and electronic equipment 0.3344 0.3679 0.8263 0.3633
Electrical and electronic components 0.1719 0.2950 0.3396 0.5601
Automobile -0.2314 0.3329 0.4832 0.4870
Shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway -0.6255 0.3706 2.8479 0.0915
a Reference is "men".
b Reference is "50 and more".
c Reference is "11 and more".
d Reference is "with no degree except CEP or BEPC".
e Reference is "unskilled blue collar".
f Reference is "99 and less".
g Reference is "food industries".
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Appendix 3: Logistic regression results for the team workers case
Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Firms’ computerization intensityh
intensity 2 0.3321 0.1888 3.0940 0.0786
intensity 3 0.4203 0.1960 4.5997 0.0320
intensity 4 0.3323 0.2140 2.4118 0.1204
Obstacles to the organizational changes
Tensions between the servicesi -0.0540 0.1773 0.0927 0.7608
Tensions with the shareholdersi -0.2445 0.2312 1.1179 0.2904
Difficulties in the relations with the other firmsi -0.0976 0.1999 0.2382 0.6255
Difficulties to school or to reclassify the staffi 0.0598 0.1538 0.1513 0.6973
Non executive staff adaptations and
establishment problemsi 0.0411 0.1639 0.0629 0.8020
Executive staff adaptations and
establishment problemsi 0.1569 0.1589 0.9750 0.3234
Clashes with the staff (petitions, strikes,...)i -0.1195 0.1930 0.3833 0.5358
Use of new organizational devices
ISO 9001, ISO 9002, EAQF Certificationj 0.4089 0.1604 6.4964 0.0108
Other certification or total
quality managementj 0.1545 0.1389 1.2379 0.2659
Value analysis, functional analysis,
or "AMDEC" methodj -0.0932 0.1582 0.3470 0.5558
5S method or Total Productive Maintenance
(TPM) methodj 0.4285 0.1631 6.8979 0.0086
Organization in profit centersj 0.1763 0.1351 1.7015 0.1921
Formal in-house customer/ supplier contractsj 0.1045 0.1380 0.5728 0.4492
System of "Just in time" deliveryj -0.3277 0.1778 3.3980 0.0653
System of "Just in time" productionj 0.1577 0.1781 0.7846 0.3757
Evolution in hierarchical layers
between 1994 and 1997k
1 and more -0.0279 0.2610 0.0114 0.9150
-1 -0.0204 0.1629 0.0156 0.9005
-2 and less -0.3818 0.2959 1.6652 0.1969
Team work
•Share of production workers participating
in self managed teamsl:
10% to 50% 0.0247 0.1780 0.0193 0.8895
50% and more 0.0651 0.2613 0.0620 0.8033
•Share of production workers participating
in problem solving groupsl:
10% to 50% 0.4672 0.1863 6.2869 0.0122
50% and more 0.8599 0.3590 5.7362 0.0166
• Share of production workers participating
in project teamsl:
10% to 50% -0.0944 0.1838 0.2640 0.6074
50% and more -0.0239 0.4492 0.0028 0.9575
•Share of others workers participating
in self managed teamsl:
10% to 50% -0.3616 0.1983 3.3244 0.0683
50% and more -0.2979 0.3314 0.8082 0.3687
h Reference is "intensity 1". See A. of appendix 2 for the construction of this variable.
i The variable is equal to 1 when the firms states that such an obstacle has been either "quite
important", or "important", or "very important", and 0 when she states that it has been
"unimportant".
j Response is either "yes" or "no".
k Reference is "0".
l Reference 10 % and less.
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Standard Wald
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
•Share of others workers participating
in problem solving groupsl:
10% to 50% 0.1016 0.2065 0.2419 0.6229
50% and more 0.2644 0.3815 0.4801 0.4884
•Share of others workers participating
in project teamsl:
10% to 50% 0.1084 0.1851 0.3428 0.5582
50% and more 0.0786 0.3393 0.0537 0.8168
•Who is/was authorized in 1997
to participate in project teams?
Managementm -0.3374 0.1701 3.9368 0.0472
Production workerm -0.1134 0.1475 0.5912 0.4420
Specialistm 0.1610 0.1591 1.0239 0.3116
•Average number of task each type
of individual is responsible forn:
1.1 to 1.4 0.0988 0.1917 0.2656 0.6063
1.5 to 1.7 0.1538 0.2221 0.4796 0.4886
1.8 and more -0.1319 0.2414 0.2984 0.5849
l Reference 10 % and less.
m Response is either "yes" or "no".
n Reference is ≤ 1. See B. of appendix 2 for the construction of the variable.
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